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JUSTICE SCALIA, POVERTY 
AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 
Toby Golick* 
Why do we care about Justice Scalia's view of the good society, 
given his limited view of the role of the courts as "not inquisitors of 
justice but arbiters of adversary claims"?' Maybe Justice Scalia 
thinks we already have a "good society," or at least a good enough 
society, and that as a result, the courts have only the classic conserva­
tive role of keeping things as they are. But judges make decisions and 
decisions change things at least a little; the changes may be steps for­
ward or backward, and when a Supreme Court Justice is taking the 
steps, it is important enough to worry about. In addition, when a 
judge is not entirely predictable, his view of society may be interesting 
enough to justify further analysis. Also, judges like Scalia who have a 
reputation for not only being smart, but dso "intellectual," are partic­
ularly interesting for scholars and lawyers, who hope despite all evi­
dence to the contrary that someone "intellectual" will also be "fair-
minded."  ^
Justice Scalia's opinions in cases involving government benefits 
for the poor provide some clues about his view of the good society. 
From these opinions we leam that in the good society, the poor had 
better not look to the courts for help. In virtually every case involv­
ing government benefits. Justice Scalia votes to defeat the claims of 
public assistance recipients.^  This paper examines several of Justice 
* Clinical Professor and Director, Bet Tzedek Legal Sevices, Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law. A.B., 1966, Barnard College, J.D., 1969, Columbia University. 
t Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Q. 482 (1989). 
2 I have misstated this proposition somewhat. A practicing lawyer wants a fair judge only 
if that is the only way to win the case. 
3 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) (sustaining regulation denying needy 
children the benefit of a $50 disregard for "child support" if they received Social Security 
benefits); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (uphol^ng policy requiring that income of all 
family members in same household be considered, even though this burdened right to live 
together); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (sustaining statute denying food 
stamps to strikers); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding restrictive Social Secur­
ity disability regulations); Mullins Coal v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Pro­
grams, 484 U.S. 135 (1987) (upholding Labor Department regulations making it more difficult 
for miners to get black lung benefits); Cardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988) (holding that 
welfare recipients are not entitled to individualized notice before their benefits were terminated 
as a result of the lump sum rule); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (social security 
recipient whose benefits were illegally terminated has no remedy in tort for money damages). 
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Scalia's opinions to try to understand why he is so resistant to the 
claims of the poor. 
I. SCALIA'S VIEW OF CHALLENGES BY WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO 
PUBLIC BENEFIT REGULATIONS 
We should put Justice Scalia's insensitivity to the poor in con­
text. Even in the good old days (to poverty lawyers, at least) of the 
Warren court, when lawyers for the poor spent hours strategizing 
about how to get to the Supreme Court as quickly as possible,^ the 
Court was never willing to recognize a basic right to food and shelter 
comparable to the basic right to, say, erect a billboard proclaiming 
that one is hungry.' Now, in a much more conservative era, poverty 
lawyers have largely abandoned generalizations about the right to life 
(the real "right to life" which means a right to a decent level of subsis­
tence®) and have turned to subsections of the subsections of statutes to 
try to squeeze out a few more dollars for the poor.^ Lawyers for the 
poor used to feel like revolutionaries articulating new social philoso­
phies; now—searching for loopholes in restrictive statutes—we feel 
like the tax lawyers for the poor. 
Lukhard v. Reed^ is an example of the eflForts by lawyers for the 
poor to find exemptions to ameliorate the hardship of unfair pubhc 
^ We especially loved three-judge courts under the former version of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 
repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381 § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, and the current 28 
U.S.C. § 2284 (1988) (permitting direct appeals to the Supreme Court) and we tried hard to 
get them convened. A lot of important welfare cases came before the Supreme Court on ap­
peal from the three-judge courts. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating 
welfare regulations disqualifying needy children based on a "man in the house"); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residency requirements for public 
assistance.) Now we prefer any strategy that avoids the Supreme Court. 
5 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) held that a regulation providing ceilings on 
welfare grants, regardless of family size, does not violate equal protection or Social Security 
Act and signalled the limits of the Supreme Court's willingness to read the Constitution expan­
sively to ^leviate problems of poverty. And after the euphoria of our numerous victories 
before the Court wore oflF, lawyers for the poor were faced with the reality that (despite the 
ringing rhetoric in some of the decisions), most of the victories were based on statutory inter­
pretations or on due process requirements for fair procedures, rather than fair amounts of 
benefits. See, e.g.. King, 392 U.S. at 309; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The good 
news is that one does not lose one's welfare benefits without a hearing. The bad news is that 
welfare benefits are not enough to live on. 
6 The term "right to life" was originally used by poverty lawyers in the 1960s to refer to a 
right to have at least adequate income to sustain life decently. The term, abandoned to the 
antiabortion forces, now refers only to the right of a fetus to be carried to term and bom, with 
no particular guarantee about life afterwards. 
' Lawyers for the poor are sticking to the state courts when trying to achieve an adequate 
standard of life for the poor. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 554 N.Y.S.2d 92, 
553 N.E. 2d 570, (1990) (recognizing right to adequate shelter allowance). 
8 481 U.S. 368 (1987). 
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assistance regulations. The issue in this case was whether a personal 
injury award to a public assistance recipient should be treated as "in­
come" or as a "resource." Not surprisingly, for many years no one— 
including public assistance recipients who had received personal in­
jury awards—cared about this question. Whether a personal injury 
award was characterized as income or resource, the rule was that the 
recipient became ineligible for public assistance for as long as she had 
the extra money. 
The issue of whether a monetary award should be treated as "in­
come" or "resource" suddenly became important in 1981 when Con­
gress enacted an extraordinarily harsh series of laws restricting 
government welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Depen­
dent Children (AFDC) program. One of the meanest of these provi­
sions was the so-called lump sum rule, designed to prevent welfare 
recipients who receive an amount of money exceeding the state's 
monthly income eligibility limit from spending it right away in order 
to quahfy again for public assistance. Under the lump sum rule, a 
welfare recipient who receives an amount of income exceeding the 
"standard of need" (the minimum subsistence level on which welfare 
benefits are based) is ineligible for as many months as that income 
would last if the recipient were to spend only an amount equal to the 
state's standard of need each month. 
The lump sum statute was generated by the fantasy of a welfare 
recipient, perhaps the hated welfare queen, somehow coming into 
thousands of dollars—^the lump sum at the end of the rainbow—^and 
spending it all in one month of high living, instead of sticking to a 
budget hke a "responsible" adult. Given that the "standard of need" 
is pitifully small even in the most generous states, the reality is that 
most welfare recipients lucky enough to come into some extra money 
cannot make it last for the period specified in the lump sum formula. 
So if the long lost uncle of a welfare recipient dies and leaves her a few 
thousand dollars in his will, then she will be worse oflF than she was 
before—with no more money than if she was getting welfare, and with 
a lot more trouble both in conserving the money for the required pe­
riod and in dealing with the administrative headache of making sure 
that benefits resume promptly when the lump sum runs out. The situ­
ation of the individual who receives a personal injury award is even 
worse; in that case the money is seldom just a lucky windfall unac­
companied by hurt and pain and extra medical expenses. 
In response to the lump sum rule, Virginia and some other states 
(who participate in the AFDC program and must comply with federal 
law in order to receive federal reimbursement for the program) re-
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vised their welfare regulations to treat personal injury awards 
(although not proceeds from the sale or conversion of real or personal 
property) as income, subject to the lump sum rule. Aflfiected welfare 
recipients sued, claiming that treating personal injury awards as "in­
come" was not permitted under federal law because personal injury 
awards, being purely compensatory and not representing real gain or 
profit to the recipients, are not income. In Justice Scalia's plurality 
opinion in Lukhard v. Reed, the court rejected the welfare recipients' 
claim by a five-to-four vote.' 
I am persuaded by Professor Kannar's analysis'" that Justice 
Scalia is not purely result-oriented, and does not start the process of 
deciding a case with the view that poor people must always lose. 
Rather, as Professor Kannar points out. Justice Scalia's results derive 
from his methodology. Unfortunately however, given this methodol­
ogy, poor people always lose. Let's watch Justice Scalia's methodol­
ogy in action in Lukhard, the lump sum case described above. 
First, Justice Scalia ignores the consequences of his decision on 
the persons affected, who are barely mentioned in the opinion. (Com­
pare Justice Powell's dissent, which describes the hardship of impov­
erished plaintiffs who are forced to choose between using their 
personal injury awards for medical care and providing for the basic 
needs of their children.) Presumably, he ignores consequences be­
cause he is rigorously not result-oriented; while sometimes this ap­
proach might be beneficial (as Professor Kannar points out, not being 
result-oriented will often help criminal defendants), it will seldom 
help the poor who often need a bit of mercy as much or more than 
they need rigorous readings of rules. 
Second (or he would probably say "first"). Justice Scalia looks at 
the "plain language" of the statutory provision at issue, which here 
states that the lump sum rule applies to "income." At this point, the 
welfare recipients lose the case, just as they will lose every case where 
it is claimed that a regulation is inconsistent with a statute. Language 
is almost always elastic enough (the "treachery and versatility of our 
language")" to accommodate multiple meanings including the mean­
ing claimed by the administrative agency. So of course even though 
the term "income" usually does not include a personal injury award, 
surely the word is broad enough to mean any money that comes in, 
and so Justice Scalia finds. 
Third, Justice Scalia rejects the welfare recipients' argument 
9 Id. 
'O Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). 
'1 See Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 352 (1960) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
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based on the administrative and legislative history of the AFDC pro­
gram. There is a lot to say about the history and purpose of the 
AFDC program, which is to protect needy families, and particularly 
needy children. However, Justice Scalia ignores the question (the an­
swer to which decided the case for Justice Powell, who wrote the dis­
sent)'^  of whether a provision working such substantial hardship on 
needy families suflfering personal injury could be consistent with a 
congressional scheme to benefit needy families. Instead, Justice Scalia 
concentrates his analysis on the microhistory of the administrative let­
ters and directives issued by the federal agency. 
Because Justice Scalia has frequently written skeptically about 
how legislative and administrative history is made and why it is unre­
liable, it is curious that he chooses to give credence to "history" as 
counterfeit as that presented here. The "history" consists of recent 
administrative rulings written by the conservative bureaucrats who 
took over the agency after the election of Ronald Reagan. These ad­
ministrative rulings, every one of which was written after the enact­
ment of the lump sum rule, announce that there is "long-standing 
precedent" for the states being able to treat personal injury awards as 
income, but not a single older document demonstrates the validity of 
the recent documents' version of history. Nor does the record show 
that any state has ever availed itself of this "long-standing precedent." 
Justice Scalia, suggesting that it is inappropriate "to speculate 
upon what Congress would have said if it had spoken," rejects the 
welfare recipients' arguments based on congressional intent: "the le­
gality of Virginia's policy must be measured against the AFDC stat­
ute Congress passed, not against the hypothetical statute it is most 
'reasonable to believe' Congress would have passed had it considered 
the question of personal injury awards.'"  ^ Justice Scalia's approach 
to congressional intent knocks out the last pillar of the welfare recipi­
ents' argument in this case and is an ominous portent to public assist­
ance advocates in other cases. Public benefit programs are enacted 
with generally benevolent purposes (or, at least, generally benevolent 
purposes are announced), and lawyers for the poor rely on these in­
tentions in their arguments that particular restrictive regulations vio­
late this intent. If so little weight is accorded to the intent and context 
of the statute, the welfare recipients challenging a restrictive regula­
tion have little on which to base their arguments. 
Justice Scalia next makes fun of the welfare recipients' argument 
12 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 392 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice PoweH's dissenting opin­
ion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor. 
" Id. at 376 n.3. 
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that the personal injury award should be treated as a resource because 
the award compensates for damage to the "resource" of a healthy 
body. Justice Scalia responds that "[sjince healthy bodies are worth 
far more than the statute's $1,000 family resource limit... acceptance 
of respondents' major premise would render every family ineligible for 
AFDC benefits.'"'' If this is a joke, it is chilling. However it seems 
not to be a joke because there is no further effort to respond to the 
welfare recipients' argument on this point. But of course, acceptance 
of the premise does not make all welfare recipients with healthy bod­
ies ineligible until they sell enough body parts to deplete their re­
source for the simple reason that certain resources of public assistance 
recipients have never been counted in determining eligibility. The re­
mark about healthy bodies, however, suggests that it is not just the 
restrictions in Justice Scalia's methodology with which welfare recipi­
ents must contend, but a degree of callousness as well. 
Sullivan v. Everhart^^ is another example of the prevailing genre 
of technical, statutory challenges to public benefits regulations—in 
this case, challenges to the Social Security Administration rules and 
regulations that govern overpayments and underpayments. Again, 
Justice Scalia's methodology results in poor people losing the case. 
The issue in the case, as described by Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion, sounds dry and uninteresting: 
If the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that a 
beneficiary has received "more or less than the correct amount of 
payment," the Social Security Act requires him to eflfect "proper 
adjustment or recovery," subject to certain restrictions in the case 
of overpayments. This case requires us to decide whether the Sec­
retary's so-called "netting" regulations, under which he calculates 
the difference between past underpayments and past overpayments, 
are merely a permissible method of determining whether "more or 
less than the correct amount of payment" was made, or are in­
stead, as to netted-out overpayments, an "adjustment or recovery" 
that must comply with procedures for recovery of overpayments 
imposed by the Act.'® 
And the hypothetical examples Justice Scalia uses to illustrate the 
problem make it sound both uninteresting and unimportant. In real­
ity, the problem of Social Security underpayments and overpayments 
is, if not exactly fascinating, of tremendous importance to affected in­
dividuals, almost all of whom are poor—a fact you would not leam 
from reading Justice Scalia's opinion. 
14 Id. at 381. 
15 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990). 
16 Id. at 962. 
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Overpayments and underpayments occur frequently in the error-
prone and complex world of Social Security benefit computations, and 
often amount to thousands of dollars—huge sums for all recipients of 
Supplemental Security Income (for whom poverty is a condition of 
eligibility) and for many, if not most. Social Security recipients who 
are by definition elderly or disabled (or their dependents or survivors). 
In recognition of the fact that overpayments are often not the fault of 
the recipient, and that repayment can cause great hardship if the 
money has been spent. Congress has mandated that the Social Secur­
ity Administration must waive collection of overpayments from any 
recipient who is without fault and if "adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes" of the Act or "would be against equity and good 
conscience." 
In general, therefore, waiver is appropriate if the overpayment 
was not the recipient's fault (note that this is quite a strict standard— 
it is not enough that the recipient did nothing to cause the overpay­
ment; the recipient must also be unaware that the payments are in the 
wrong amount) and, in addition, if recovery of the overpayment 
would cause financial hardship. 
With few exceptions, as a practical matter, the only individuals 
who ever meet the test for waivers are poor. In 1979, the Supreme 
Court (recognizing the importance of the waiver provisions) read into 
the statute a requirement for a prior oral hearing before a requested 
waiver was denied.'® In 1989, the Court considered a challenge to the 
validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary to defeat the stat­
utory waiver provisions when a recipient had received both underpay­
ments and overpayments." Instead of (as in the past) considering the 
overpayments separately to determine if waiver applied, the overpay­
ment and underpayment are calculated together ("netted") and the 
recipient has no opportunity to seek waiver of any part of the over­
payment netted against the underpayment.^" 
Justice Scalia, writing for a divided five-to-four Court, found no 
problem with this regulatory scheme. His approach is profoundly dis­
couraging to advocates for the poor. 
First, he neutralizes the issue by ignoring the human dimensions 
of the problems faced by plaintiffs who live in a real world of poverty, 
illness and overdue bills. He illustrates the problem raised by the case 
in terms of a "hypothetical" couple, coolly called Mr. A and Mrs. B, 
17 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1988). 
1® Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 687 (1979). 
19 Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990). 
20 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.504, 416.538 (1990). 
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each of whom has underpayments and overpayments amounting to 
under $50. In contrast, Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, 
chooses the real life example of the plaintiff Emil Zwiezen and his 
wife, who lost thousands of dollars in benefits because of the netting 
rule and as a result "could not pay his water bills, had fallen behind in 
his house payments, and feared that his doctor and druggist would 
stop providing him medical care."^' 
Justice Scalia's next step is to look at the "plain" language of the 
statute, and of course (as will almost always be possible) there is a 
way to read the words to permit the result reached. As Justice Felix 
Frankfurter has pointed out, "[t]he notion that because the words of a 
statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious 
oversimplification."^^ 
Reaching this result requires ignoring the intent of Congress, as 
reflected in the mandatory language of the waiver statute. Because 
waiver is guaranteed for "any" adjustment or recovery Justice Scaha 
writes that the agency is not engaged in adjustment or recovery when 
it nets an underpayment against an overpayment, but is simply calcu­
lating whether more or less than the correct amount of payment has 
been made. Only after that calculation is made, in Justice Scalia's 
view, does the Secretary decide whether any remaining overpayment 
should be waived. 
The next step is to determine if the result accords with the stat­
ute, but here, as in Lukhard v. Reed, the test is a negative one—not is 
it the result most consistent with the statutory scheme, but is it an 
"absurd" result? Justice Scalia's answer is that it is not absurd, be­
cause it is not as much of a hardship not to receive a payment due 
(when an underpayment is reduced by a past overpayment) as it is to 
have to pay over cash, so the waiver provisions need only apply to the 
latter. But if the only test a regulation need meet is that it does not 
produce an "absurd" result, any challenge to a regulation does not 
stand much chance. 
II. Is THERE ANYTHING TO BE HAPPY ABOUT? 
It is sometimes suggested that Justice Scalia's narrow view of the 
role of the Court may, in the end, be a good thing given the Court's 
current composition. Regrettably, however, there are some signs that 
when private property interests are threatened, deference to the legis-
21 Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall 
and Kennedy). 
22 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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lature becomes less important, and Justice Scalia may be willing to see 
the Court take an activist role. 
In Pennell v. San Jose,^^ Justice Scalia dissented from a decision 
upholding a California rent control regulation, which included a pro­
vision permitting a hearing officer to consider the tenant's financial 
hardship in determining if the regulated rent was excessive. The land­
lords tiad argued that this provision constituted an unconstitutional 
taking of private property without compensation. The majority said 
that the issue was premature because there was no record that the 
hardship provision had ever been applied. 
Justice Scalia, who in other contexts has been quick to urge the 
Court not to reach out to decide cases unnecessarily,^ '^  here argues 
vehemently that the lack of any showing that the hardship regulation 
has been apphed is "no reason thus to shield alleged constitutional 
injustice from judicial scrutiny." '^ Is this the same justice who in 
Webster v. Doe"  ^ dismissed the notion that all constitutional viola­
tions must be remediable in Court? And what about the fact that the 
provision at issue was enacted as part of the normal legislative pro­
cess, so respected by Justice Scalia in other contexts? In his dissent. 
Justice Scalia reasons that the rent control ordinance redistributes 
wealth in a way hidden from public scrutiny, rather than by the "nor­
mal democratic processes." '^ This case is not a good sign about 
where we will find Justice Scalia if the government ever moves toward 
greater eflforts to redistribute wealth.^ ® 
III. Is THERE ANY HOPE? 
There is always hope, but hope is not always reasonable. It is a 
sad but safe prediction that public assistance recipients challenging 
unfair public assistance programs will seldom persuade Justice Scalia, 
given his narrow view of the role of the courts. 
During his confirmation hearing, Justice Scalia spoke engagingly 
of the beauty of the American system of checks and balances: 
23 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
24 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
school suspension case should be dismissed as moot because the individual plaintiff had not 
demonstrated that it was "probable" that the problem would recur). 
25 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
26 486 U.S. 592, 606 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
22 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
28 I wonder if Justice Scalia particularly disapproves of rent controls. In his contribution 
to a Federalist Society symposium on federalism, then-Professor Scalia urged conservatives to 
consider federal legislation to mandate market freedom, and asked (rhetorically?) why no one 
has considered a federal law banning rent control. Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1982). 
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[I]f you had to put your finger on what has made our Constitution 
so enduring, I think it is the original document before the amend­
ments were added. 
Because the amendments [the Bill of Rights], by themselves, 
do not do anything. The Russian constitution probably has better, 
or at least as good guarantees of personal freedom as our document 
does. What makes it work, what assures that those words are not 
just hollow promises, is the structure of government that the origi­
nal Constitution established, the checks and balances among the 
three branches, in particular, so that no one of them is able to "run 
roughshod" over the liberties of the people as those liberties are 
described in the Bill of Rights.^' 
Justice Scalia has an extremely optimistic (although perhaps in­
sincere) view of the legislature's capacity to correct injustice, restrict­
ing the Court's role to "making it inescapably clear to Congress what 
changes need to be made."^° 
The problems of access to the democratic process do not much 
trouble Justice Scalia. In Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 
then-Judge Scalia dissented from a decision granting standing to indi­
viduals challenging United States Department of Agriculture milk 
regulations that raised prices. Justice Scalia observed, 
"[gjovemmental mischief whose effects are widely distributed is more 
readily remedied through the political process, and does not call into 
play the distinctive function of the courts as guardians against oppres­
sion of the few by the many."^^ The difficulty of mobilizing a large 
political constituency when the issue is raising milk prices only a few 
cents for each consumer is not addressed in the opinion. 
But even when the "distinctive function of the courts as guardi­
ans against oppression of the few by the many" is called into play 
Justice Scalia still doesn't see a role for the courts. In Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion held that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits 
to individuals fired for using a drug prohibited by state law during 
religious ritual.^'* His opinion states: "Values that are protected 
against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of 
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process" and there-
29 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, 1986: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1986) [hereinafter .ffear/ngi] (testimony of Antonin Scalia). 
20 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471, 481-82 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
31 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
32 Id. at 1256. 
33 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
34 Id. at 1606. 
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fore, it is up to the Oregon state legislature to make exception to their 
drug laws for sacramental peyote use.^' Justice Scalia's opinion goes 
on to recognize that 
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela­
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely en­
gaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each con­
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weight the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs. 
But as Justice O'Connor aptly points out in her sharp concurrence, 
"the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of 
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and 
may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doc­
trine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had 
on unpopular or emerging religious groups."^' 
Other aspects of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence are also not en­
couraging for the poor hoping that the good society will include them. 
Justice Scalia hates balancing tests. But the poor often fare very well 
on balancing tests because their needs are so urgent.^® His opinion in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith il­
lustrates his willingness to jettison years of "painstakingly"^ devel­
oped standards to avoid requiring the Court to apply a traditional 
balancing approach. Justice Scalia describes as "horrible" the con­
templation of federal judges being "constantly in the business" of 
weighing claims for religious exemption from generally applicable 
laws.'^' Justice O'Connor describes the process more simply, stating 
that it is "our role as judges to decide each case on its individual 
merits.'"*^ 
Another aspect of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence that is troubling 
for the poor is his love of clean, bright lines and rules that are strictly 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
38 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (individual's overpowering need 
not to be deprived of basic assistance outweighs justified desire to protect public funds). 
39 Employment Division, 110 S. Ct. at 1595. 
40 /d. at 1615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
4t Id. at 1606 n.5. For other examples of Justice Scalia's hostility to balancing tests, see 
Rutan V. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746-57 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court should overrule cases permitting balancing test for determining whether party 
membership may be required for government job) and Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enters., 
486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (urging abandonment of balanc­
ing approach in negative commerce clause cases). 
42 110 S. Ct. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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enforced, regardless of the circumstances. His dissent in Houston v. 
Lack*^ is a disturbing example of this approach. In that case, the 
issue was whether a prisoner's pro se notice of appeal was timely filed. 
Because the prisoner lacked funds, prison authorities had refused his 
requests to certify the notice for mailing on the day in question and to 
send it air mail. The notice was received late, and the question was 
whether the otherwise meritorious appeal should be dismissed. 
The majority held that the notice was timely because the prisoner 
had timely delivered it to prison officials.^ (Perhaps trying for Justice 
Scalia's vote, the majority opinion urged that their approach was 
bright line because it would recognize the moment of receipt by 
prison authorities as the moment of filing.)'^^ In contrast. Justice 
Scalia's dissent argues that the rule adopted by the majority should be 
rejected even though it "makes sense," for Congress, not the courts, 
should enact such a rule. Justice Scalia specifically rejects the bright 
line argument, noting that once equitable considerations are applied, 
other circumstances will be urged as excusing compliance with the 
rules. "Thus is wasteful litigation in our appellate courts multi­
plied.'"^ Justice Scalia may be correct in arguing that too many 
bright lines defeat the purpose of a rule. However, it hardly seems 
"wasteful" for the courts to decide issues as important as whether 
individuals should be denied access to appellate remedies based on 
technical defaults that are not their fault. 
IV. Is THERE A GLIMMER OF HOPE? 
During his confirmation hearings. Justice Scalia said, "courts 
should be, obviously, as concerned about massive societal problems, 
such as the problem of discrimination in this country as either of the 
other two branches of government.'"^' Is there any chance that his 
concern will be translated into action? 
I have been interested to note that in Justice Scalia's decisions on 
social welfare issues, he frequently mentions (albeit in passing) policy 
issues, as if to say, that while they do not really matter to his result, 
the result is not as harsh as it seems. In his dissent in Pennell v. San 
Jose, the California rent control case. Justice Scalia observes that the 
"hardship" exceptions for rent increases are available to individuals 
« 487 U.S. 266 (1988). 
44 Id. at 270. 
45 Id. at 275. 
46 Id. at 281. 
47 Hearings, supra note 29, at 59. 
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making up to $32,400 a year.'^ ® Of course, it is irrelevant to the due 
process-taking analysis that the municipality is extremely generous, or 
even overly generous, in defining hardship. Does mentioning that 
some of the rent control tenants are relatively well off reflect some 
sensitivity to the problems of the poor? If so, it is a very limited sensi­
tivity, and one that does not bear close analysis. It is not just the 
unworthy tenant making $32,400 who loses a benefit if the rent con­
trol ordinance is invalid; obviously the worthy tenant making $3,000 
is also hurt, and even more so. 
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Everhart, the Social Security netting 
case. Justice Scalia mentions that having an underpayment reduced 
by a past overpayment will not hurt a Social Security recipient as 
much as a reduction in current benefits.^ ' And he justifies his crabbed 
interpretation of Social Security waiver and netting rules by noting 
that the "expenses" of the Social Security recipients proposal "in the 
end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available 
for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited."'® Ad­
vocates for the poor should be forgiven a certain skepticism about 
whether the money saved by denying due process to some poor per­
sons will be redistributed among the poor. But does Justice Scalia's 
remark show some rudimentary sensitivity to the needs of recipients, 
or some guilt about the result? Or is this just a kind of in terrorem 
clause of the opinion, warning recipients that if they keep asking for 
more, they may end up with less? 
Maybe there is a basis for hope after all. This past term. Justice 
Scalia joined the majority in Sullivan v. Zebley,^  ^ invalidating Social 
Security regulations denying Supplemental Security Income disability 
benefits to disabled children whose impairment is not mentioned on 
the "hst" of impairments contained in the regulations. Given his ju­
risprudence, he should have come out the opposite way. As in Ever­
hart, the statute could be read to justify the Secretary's regulation 
(and several other courts had so read it)." There is the principle of 
deference to the agency's interpretation. There is a regulatory scheme 
with the clearest and cleanest of bright lines— i^f the child's impair­
ment is on the list, the child gets benefits; if not, benefits are denied. 
There is the certainty that if the Secretary's regulatory scheme is re­
jected in favor of a more individualized approach to children's disabil-
48 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988). 
49 110 S. Ct. 960, 966 (1990). 
so Id. at 967 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). 
51 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990). 
52 Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 742 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 
1984); Powell ex rel. Powell v. Schwecker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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ity, the courts will be busy—as with the adult disability program— 
reviewing the Secretary's determinations. But despite all that, there is 
Justice Scalia with the majority invalidating the regulation. 
We can only guess at Justice Scalia's reasoning. Unfortunately 
for those trying to understand Justice Scalia, but fortunately for the 
children, the opinion was written by Justice Blackmun. Possibly Jus­
tice Scalia was not unmoved by the reality of thousands of indigent 
severely disabled children (and their families, struggling to care for 
them at home) deprived of benefits. Indeed only the most hard­
hearted Justice (Justice White) or the most heartless (Justice Rehn-
quist) was unaffected and dissented. 
There may be a lesson here for advocates. Perhaps in our pessi­
mism and wish to be taken seriously as calm, analytical lawyers rather 
than wild-eyed (or teary-eyed, for some) lunatics with law degrees, we 
have not been working hard enough to demonstrate to the courts the 
extreme misery of our clients' lives. Still, Zebley is more likely an 
aberration than a straw in the wind. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not enough in a "good society" for the poor to be free to 
bum the flag to protest their hunger, homelessness and oppression.'^ 
In a good society of our wealth, no one should be without adequate 
food, clothing, or shelter. And the courts should be open to their 
claims, as to the claims of others who are oppressed by the majority. 
Lawyers and courts have a role in attaining the good society and, even 
if it is a long way off, perhaps we can make some things better for the 
poor as we struggle toward this goal. If we succeed, I fear it will be 
despite and not because of Mr. Justice Scalia. 
'3 And the poor had better stick to flag burning in Scalia's good society. Sleeping in a 
public park, as a means of protesting the plight of the homeless, may be forbidden. See Com­
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissent­
ing, with whom ScaUa, J., concurs). 
